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Help or Hindrance? Boardroom Network Connectivity 
and Firm Performance 
Abstract 
While boardroom networks should act as a conduit for resource sharing between firms, and in doing so 
improve firm performance, recent evidence on the value of connected boards is limited and 
inconclusive.  This study aims to provide additional evidence on the impact of board connectivity on 
firm performance by exploring Australian listed firms between 2001 and 2011. We employ four 
dimensions of connectivity; measuring the quantity, speed and quality of information flow and resource 
sharing, and a firms access to the best-connected boards. We also employ a factor of the four 
connectivity dimensions. Our findings show more connected boards have lower firm performance, 
measured with Tobin’s Q. The results remain consistent after controlling for alternative measures of 
firm performance, and model specifications. The results suggest that boardroom networks are not a 
value-enhancing tool for boards. 
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1. Introduction 
The prevailing literature has identified two primary roles for the board of directors; an agency role 
monitoring management, and as a provider of “human capital” resources.  While much of the finance 
literature has focused on directors providing oversight for managers (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Fama, 
1980), resource dependency theory, based heavily in the management literature, contends that directors 
play a role in assisting managers by providing advice and counsel, and access to additional expertise 
and connections (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Resource dependence theory 
therefore argues that board capital attributes, such as skills, experiences, knowledge and connections, 
should add value to the firm.  
One aspect of board capital that is yet to be fully examined is the role of board connectivity. Due to the 
extensive skillset directors require, the pool of qualified directors is limited. As a result, directors often 
appear on multiple boards, creating interlocks. Prior literature has established that interlocking boards 
facilitate flows of information, such as sharing experiences and mistakes (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 
1993), and can create beneficial relationships (Dooley, 1969; Houston et al., 2014), allow firms to trade 
favours (Engelberg et al., 2012) and negotiate better contractual arrangements (Mizruchi, 1996). 
However, interlocks may also result in firms circulating value-decreasing corporate practices (Bizjak et 
al., 2009), replicating mistakes (Mizruchi, 1996), may weaken monitoring (Fich & White, 2003) and, 
could result in cartel behaviour, price collusion and reduced competition (Mizruchi, 1996). 
Additionally, firms may become overwhelmed with too much information (Chewning & Harrell, 1990; 
O'Reilly, 1980). 
Studies looking at the impact of interlocks on firm performance generally find either no impact (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2006) or a negative effect (Non & Franses, 2007; Santos et al., 2009). More recently 
studies have started to employ social network theory to explore board connections in a wider context. 
Social network theory argues that interlocking boards create a wider network of firms, allowing the 
flow of resources and information between distant firms through intermediary firms (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994) which the interlocking literature fails to consider. Firms in a larger network and those well 
positioned in terms of access to information should have access to more resources through the network 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Horton et al., 2012; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  However, while theory 
suggests that well-connected firms should benefit more, the empirical evidence to date is mixed. Some 
studies find a positive association between board connectivity and firm performance (Horton et al., 
2012; Larcker et al., 2013), while others find a negative impact (Andres et al., 2013; Omer et al., 2013). 
This study examines the effect of social network measures of board connectivity on firm performance 
in Australia. We use a sample of firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) between 
2001 and 2011, resulting in 10,599 firm-year observations. We employ four measures of board 
5 
 
connectivity drawn from the social network theory; Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector, 
which measure different aspects of firm connectivity. In addition, we employ principle component 
analysis (PCA) to derive a connectivity factor. Using regression analysis, we test the network 
connectivity measures against firm performance defined as Tobin’s Q, although we additionally test the 
impact of connectivity on return on assets and total stock returns. Additionally, we consider both a 
contemporaneous relationship, and firm performance one-year ahead of connectivity and employ both 
pooled OLS and firm fixed effects with lagged dependent variables to control for potential endogeneity.  
After controlling for other factors that may influence the relationship, we observe a negative relationship 
between connectivity and firm performance, consistent with Omer et al. (2013) and Andres et al. (2013).  
Irrespective of the connectivity measure employed, board connectivity detrimentally impacts on firm 
performance. Additionally, the connectivity factor, created using PCA, also shows board connectivity 
harms firm performance. The findings remain broadly consistent despite employing alternative firm 
performance measures and using alternative model specifications. Additionally, we test for potential 
reverse causality and find that rather than changes in connectedness driving changes in firm 
performance, it is firm performance that drives changes in the level of connectedness.  Specifically, an 
increase in Tobin’s Q is associated with a subsequent increase in Eigenvector. The results show that 
more connected boards negatively impact on firm performance. Several possible explanations have 
been offered for this including firms receiving too much information to be efficiently processed, the 
introduction of value decreasing corporate practices or undermining board monitoring.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion on the related 
board network literature commencing with evidence on interlocks and the resulting network flow, 
followed by board connectivity. Section 3 outlines the data, methodology and sample statistics, 
including a comprehensive description of the network measures employed. Section 4 presents a 
discussion of the empirical results, beginning with the main findings followed by robustness tests. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review and hypotheses development 
2.1 The Role of the Board of Directors 
While much of the finance literature has focused on the boards monitoring role, there is a growing focus 
on the broader role that boards have in the operating and strategic direction of the company (Hillman et 
al., 2009; Masulis et al., 2012). Directors are selected for the considerable skills, knowledge and 
expertise they bring to the role, which makes for a relatively limited pool of qualified individuals. As a 
result, board members may hold multiple directorships, creating interlocks between the boards of those 
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companies. Directors holding multiple board seats also opens up access to a wider pool of experiences, 
knowledge and connections which may add additional value to the firm. 
An increasing body of literature examines interlocking relationships between firms. Board interlocks 
establish networks between firms that allow for the spread of information (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) 
allowing for firms to learn from others. For instance, Haunschild (1993) finds that interlocking boards 
are more likely to mimic the recent acquisition activities of the firms they are connected to. Further, 
Davis (1991) finds that the more ties a firm has to those that have adopted a poison pill clause, the more 
likely they are to adopt the practice themselves. As well as imitating corporate strategies, interlocked 
directors may also pass on the experiences and mistakes made by other firms (Mizruchi, 1996).  CEO’s 
interviewed in Useem (1984) contend that seats on other boards provide private information that 
executives can use within their own firm.   
Additionally, multiple directorships also help to facilitate beneficial business relationships. Studies have 
found that firms connected to the banking and financial sector (Engelberg et al., 2012) or with political 
connections (Houston et al., 2014) have lower interest rates with fewer debt covenants, which improves 
shareholder value. Interlocks also assist with contract negotiations, as the social rapport between 
directors may result in quid-pro-quo behaviour (Mizruchi, 1996) and improve negotiations with 
suppliers of key inputs (Schoorman et al., 1981).  
While the above benefits have been documented, other studies have identified issues with interlocks. 
For instance, interlocking boards may result in spreading value-decreasing corporate practices. For 
example, stock options backdating is common in firms with interlocking boards (Bizjak et al., 2009).  
Likewise, shared knowledge may also result in firms replicating mistakes in operating procedures or 
strategic decisions (Mizruchi, 1996), or imitating activities that give them a bad name, such as earnings 
management (Chiu et al., 2012). It may also be that interlocks undermines corporate governance. Fich 
and White (2003), for instance, find CEO pay tends to be higher and CEO turnover lower when the 
boards are “mutually interlocked”.1  Additionally, firms may engage in cartel behaviour, colluding on 
price and reducing competition, raising significant legal hazards which can severely reduce the value 
of the firm if discovered (Mizruchi, 1996).  
Another issue that can arise is directors who hold too many board seats. Directors with a lot of 
directorships may be unproductive due to higher stress levels and limitations on the time a director can 
expend on each firm.  This is referred to as “busyness”2 and has been shown to result in reduced 
monitoring and firm performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006).  
                                                     
1 Mutually interlocked is defined as when a board has at least two directors who are also members of another firms board (Fich 
& White, 2003). 
2 “Busyness” is referred to by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) as an outside director who holds three or more directorships. 
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Additionally, highly connected boards may receive too much information. Unless firms are able to 
efficiently process the information they receive, the firms risk being overloaded (Swain & Haka, 2000), 
distorting a firm’s ability to make good decisions regarding their forthcoming plans (Chewning & 
Harrell, 1990; O'Reilly, 1980).  
2.1.1 Connectivity and Firm Performance 
Recently, studies have begun to focus on the economic outcomes of corporate ties, finding a generally 
negative relationship between interlocks and firm performance.  For instance, Kiel & Nicholson (2006) 
investigate the impact of interlocks on stock returns in Australia and find no significant relationship. 
Non and Franses (2007) examine a sample of 101 large firms in the Netherlands between 1994 and 
2004 and find that interlocks have a small negative effect on firm performance. Santos, Da Silveira, and 
Barros (2009) study the Brazilian market using a sample of firms for three years, 2001, 2003, and 2005, 
and find that Tobin’s Q is negatively impacted by board interlocks. They do find however, that a small 
number of interlocks is beneficial with the optimal number at around five connections. One issue with 
these studies is that they are primarily focused just on the direct connections between firms, and so fail 
to consider other dimensions of connectedness. 
Social network theory argues that if Firm A is directly connected Firm B, it is by extension also 
indirectly connected to each of the others firms that are directly connected to Firm B, establishing a 
broad network of firms. This allows for estimating and measuring a number of additional dimensions 
of connectivity which may impact firm value. The four measures commonly used in the social network 
literature are Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector. Degree measures the direct connections 
a firm has, essentially the number of interlocks, and proxies for the direct access to information a firm 
has. In contrast, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector measure the indirect connections of a firm. 
Closeness estimates how central a board is within a network by looking at the distance between the firm 
and the rest of the firms in the network, measured by the shortest number of connections between two 
firms. More central firms have better quality and faster access to information.  Betweenness measures 
the intermediate connections a board has, defined as being between two other firms. Intermediately 
linked firms act as conduits for information and resources between indirectly connected firms, giving 
the intermediary firm access or the ability to control the flow of this information and resources. 
Eigenvector measures the extent to which a firm is connected to highly connected companies by 
considering both the number and connectivity of its connections. In our setting, a higher Eigenvector 
measure indicates better access to information and resources from highly connected boards. 
The different dimensions of connectivity capture distinct yet interrelated aspects of a firm’s connections 
and collectively demonstrate a firms overall position in the corporate network. To accurately estimate 
the impact of connectivity on firm performance, it is important to consider connectivity within a broader 
context. 
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2.1.2 Board Connectivity 
To date, few studies have empirically investigated the effect of board connectivity on firm performance.  
Hochberg et al. (2007) were the first to apply social network measures within the finance context, 
finding that better connected venture capital firms have significantly better fund performance. Horton 
et al. (2012) also finds that better connected firms have improved firm performance, based on total stock 
returns, market to book ratios and return on assets, for London Stock Exchange listed firms. They also 
find that well-connected directors are compensated for the benefits that their better connections are 
perceived as providing. Larcker et al. (2013) examines a composite score based on the four connectivity 
measures in the US for both public and private companies. They find that more central (connected) 
firms earn superior characteristic-adjusted returns and have higher future growth in return on assets.  
Their findings are stronger for growth firms, and firms facing adverse circumstances which implies that 
these types of firms benefit most from board connectivity.  
In contrast, Omer et al. (2013) examines firms in the US and find that the impact on return on assets 
and Tobin’s Q depends on the connectivity measure, a positive relationship with Degree but negative 
relationships with Closeness and Eigenvector. Along similar lines, Andres et al. (2013) finds that 
German companies with well-connected boards (Degree and Eigenvector) perform worse. The authors 
also argue that the negative effect is driven by board connections undermining the monitoring role of 
directors. Given the conflicting evidence on the impact of board connectivity and firm performance, the 
value of well-connected boards remains an open question. It is also intriguing that while well connected 
directors appear to be paid for their connections, yet it is not clear that those connections are value 
enhancing.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Network Construction and Measures 
The linkages formed by directors sitting on multiple boards create more complex networks where 
boards can act as intermediaries between unconnected firms. These wider networks can be viewed 
within the framework of social network theory. An example of a simple board network is presented in 
Figure 1. Within this example, Firm 5 has board members sitting on the other four companies’ boards 
and occupies the most central position in the network in terms of direct connections. Firm 5 also 
represents an intermediary for information flows between firms not directly connected, such as Firms 
4 and 2. We employ four commonly used social network measures that measure different aspects of a 
firm’s position and centrality within the network. The first measure we employ is the number of direct 
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connections a firm has, referred to as Degree in Freeman (1979), and which is a very similar measure 
to board interlocks as applied in previous studies (e.g. Non & Frances, 2007).  Degree is defined as the 
number of unique direct connections between the board members of Firm i and all other firms, i.e. 
𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐷 = ∑ 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑛−1𝑗=1 ,   𝑗 ≠ 𝑖            
 (1) 
Where δ(i,j) is a dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one director in common between 
Firms i and j and zero otherwise.3 Degree measures a firm’s direct access to information. A higher 
Degree score indicates a firm with more connections, and by extension more opportunities for the firm 
to exchange or acquire information (Freeman, 1979).  To take into account differences in network size 
between years we divide Degree by (n – 1), where n is the number of firms in the network that year 
(Hochberg et al., 2007; Horton et al., 2012).  Degree therefore represents the percentage of the total 
number of direct connections possible a firm has (Freeman, 1979). 
The second measure we employ is Closeness.  Closeness measures the quality of relationships a firm 
has by measuring the shortest distance between two firms. For instance, Figure 1 shows that while Firms 
2 and 4 are not directly connected, indirect information channels exist via Firms 1, 3 and 5. As a result 
Firms 2 and 4 have two degrees of separation.  Shorter distances allow for more timely information 
flows. We define Closeness as the sum of the inverse of the shortest distance between Firm i and all 
other firms in the network (Freeman, 1979) i.e. 
𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)
−1𝑛−1
𝑗=1 ,    𝑗 ≠ 𝑖               
 (2) 
Where n is the total number of firms in the network and d(i,j) is the shortest distance between Firm i 
and Firm j.  We deal with the issue of firms that are isolated from the main network, either forming 
small disconnected networks or being completely unconnected, by setting the distance between 
unconnected firms to 0 (Opsahl et al., 2010).4 This measure is normalised by dividing by (n-1) 
representing the percentage of the maximum Closeness possible for a given Firm i.   
The third measure we employ is Betweenness, which is designed to measure the volume of information 
passing through and potentially controlled by a given firm.  Intuitively, a company sitting between two 
other companies is in a position to control and restrict the flow of information between those firms, 
such as withholding information on potential investment opportunities (Borgatti, 2005; Freeman, 1979).  
However, the more connections a firm has, the weaker the ability of other firms to restrict their flow of 
                                                     
3 We define a director as a director or an alternative director position held on the board of a firm for the majority of one year. 
4 For a more detailed discussion on the measurement of Closeness please refer to Freeman (1979) and Borgatti (2005).  For a 
discussion on using the Freeman (1979) measure for disconnected networks, and the limitation of restricting the sample to the 
main component, refer to Omer et al (2013, p. 19 & 41). 
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information. In Figure 1 for instance, Firm 5 is limited in its ability to restrict information flows between 
firms 2 and 4 because information can also flow via firms 1 and 3. Freeman (1979) explains that the 
potential control for a firm i who sits in between two other firms, is the probability that i falls on a 
randomly selected shortest path linking (h,j).  Let 𝑔(ℎ, 𝑗) be the number of shortest paths linking two 
boards, then the probability we observe in year t is: 
𝐵(ℎ,𝑖,𝑗)𝜏
𝐵 =
𝑔(ℎ,𝑖,𝑗)
𝑔(ℎ,𝑗)
                       
 (3) 
Where 𝑔(ℎ, 𝑗) is the maximum number of communication paths another board could be in a position to 
control.  Therefore, the information passing between (h,j) can be completely controlled by i when 
𝐵(ℎ,𝑖,𝑗),𝜏
𝐵  =1.The overall Betweenness of Firm i is the sum of the proportions of all the shortest paths 
linking two firms which pass through Firm i: 
𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐵 = ∑ ∑ 𝐵(ℎ,𝑖,𝑗)𝜏
𝐵𝑛−1
𝑗
𝑛−1
ℎ<  ,     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ℎ ≠  𝑖 ≠  𝑗      
  (4) 
N is the number of firms in the network and 𝐵(ℎ,𝑖,𝑗)
𝐵  is defined as per Equation (3). Again, we normalise 
Betweenness by expressing it as the proportion of its maximum value possible in year t.  The maximum 
value for 𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐵  is measured as (𝑛^2 − 3𝑛 + 2)/2 (Freeman, 1979).  Accordingly, the relative 
Betweenness centrality in year t is: 
𝐶′𝑖,𝜏
𝐵  =  
2(𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐵 )
𝑛2−3𝑛+2
                 (5) 
Where 𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐵  is defined by Equation (4) and n represents the number of boards in the network. 
 Our fourth measure is Eigenvector which captures the quality of the firms with which a firm is 
connected. Being directly connected to a highly connected firm increases a firm’s direct access to more 
information (Omer et al., 2013).  Eigenvector is defined as the sum of Firm i's first degree connections 
to all other firms (δ(i,j)) in the network, weighted by the connectedness of the firms to which it is 
connected to, i.e. 
𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝐸 =
1
𝜆
∑ 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗) 𝐶𝑗,𝜏
𝐸𝑛
𝑗=1 ,    𝑗 ≠ 𝑖           
  (6) 
Where 𝐶𝜏
𝐸 is the Eigenvector score for a particular firm, 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗) is defined as Equation (1), and 𝜆 is a 
constant, defined as the maximum possible eigenvector for the given network in year t.  Connections to 
highly connected firms will increase a firms Eigenvector score more than connections to less connected 
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firms. Theoretically, this power may enhance a firms prospects of obtaining beneficial informational 
resources. 
Additionally, we also generate a connectivity factor by conducting principle components analysis on 
the four connectivity factors. PCA gives one factor that accounts for 69% of all the variability observed 
in the connectivity measures. Additionally, the Cronbach’s Alpha for the connectivity factor is .8479, 
exceeding the threshold of .8 required for a statistically reliable factor5.  
3.2 Firm Performance Measures 
To estimate firm performance, we rely primarily on Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q, or common proxies for it 
have been previously employed in studies of board connectivity and firm performance (Andres, 2008; 
Horton et al., 2012; Omer et al., 2013). We estimate Tobin’s Q (TQ) as the aggregate market value of a 
firm’s book value of short and long-term liabilities, the liquidation value of a firm’s preferred stock that 
is outstanding, minority interests, and the firm’s market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end, over 
its book value of total assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994).  We measure our firm performance measure both 
concurrently, one-year ahead (t+1) and additionally include Tobin’s Q lagged a year to control for the 
possibility that past performance determines how a firm is connected.6  
3.3 Empirical Design 
We analyse the relationship between board connectivity and firm performance, by treating our data as 
an unbalanced panel and estimating a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model with year and industry 
dummies in the form: 
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝜏+𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽
1𝐶𝑖,𝜏
𝜑
 + ∑ 𝛿𝜅𝜅𝑘=1 𝛸𝑖,𝜏
𝜅 + ∑ 𝜓𝛵𝛵𝛵=1 𝑌𝜏
𝛵 +  ∑ 𝜆𝜘𝜘𝜘=1 𝛪𝑖
𝜘 +  𝜀𝑖,𝜏+𝑡        (7) 
where 𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝜏+𝑡 represents one of the proxies for firm performance, either in the current or following year, 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜑
 represents one of the four measures of connectivity,  𝑿𝑖,𝜏 represents a vector of firm-level and 
corporate governance characteristics to control for observable factors, 𝑌𝜏 and 𝐼𝑖 are year and industry 
dummies respectively. Additionally, we cluster the standard errors by firm (Petersen, 2009). We also 
run a fixed effect model including a lagged dependent variable to control for potential endogeneity 
issues, consistent with literature in the area (Horton et al. 2012; Adam and Ferreira, 2009). 
We include a number of controls in our analysis. First, we include firm size, as large firms are typically 
more connected and perform better (Banz, 1981; Horton et al., 2012; Omer et al., 2013). We define size 
as the fiscal year-end market capitalisation (MV). Additionally, we also control for leverage which has 
                                                     
5 Additional details on the PCA factor generated can be found in Appendix 1.  
6 We also test firm performance out to t+3. The results are very similar to t+1 and so are not reported for the sake of brevity.  
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been shown to play a role in motivating profit generation (Baker, 1973).  We define leverage (LEV) as 
the book value of short and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Older firms are likely 
more established and potentially profitable and may find it easier to attract better quality directors. We 
measure firm age (AGE), as the number of years that a stock had been listed on the ASX (Barnea & 
Guedj, 2007; Core et al., 1999). To capture firm risk (similar to Core et al., 1999), we include the return 
volatility for a firm measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns from January to 
December (RISK) for year t.  
We also control for the internal corporate governance of each firm based on the corporate governance 
index of Henry (2008), who created an index relevant to the regulatory environment in Australia based 
on the Australian Stock Exchange recommendations. The index assigns firms 1 point each for having 
the following corporate governance characteristics: more than 50% of the board as independent 
directors, an independent board chair, an independent audit committee, an independent remuneration 
committee, and independent nomination committee, a board that has less than the annual median board 
members, if total benefits to directors divided by revenue is greater than the annual median level and if 
options issued to executive directors divided by revenue is greater than the annual median level for all 
firms. We collect this information from the SIRCA Corporate Governance Database for each firm-year 
and calculate annual corporate governance index scores using the same definitions as Henry (2008). 
We also control for the percentage of female directors on the board, as female directors have been 
shown to improve firm performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), and given the relative scarcity of female 
directors, individuals may sit on a greater than average number of boards making them more connected. 
Finally, we capture the experience the board has in monitoring a firm, by controlling for the tenure of 
the board (TEN), defined as the average length of time the directors have served on the board (Horton 
et al., 2012).   
To control for industry and time we create dummy variables using level 1 Industry Classification 
Benchmark codes and the year7. To remove the effect of extreme outliers on the results, we winsorize 
ROA, TSR MV, LEV, and RISK at the 1st and 99th percentile and TQ at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
3.4 Data 
We address whether board connectivity has an effect on firm performance by examining firms listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2011. Australia provides an interesting setting to 
explore the impact of connectivity on firm performance as it represents a well-developed market, with 
a strong regulatory regime, and similar market, cultural and legal characteristics to the United States 
and the United Kingdom (where previous studies have been performed). Accordingly, Australia 
                                                     
7 Industry dummies were excluded from tests using firm fixed effects.  
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provides a sound setting for acquiring additional empirical evidence that is comparable to the current 
literature (Horton et al., 2012; Larcker et al., 2013; Omer et al., 2013).  
We first construct boardroom networks consisting of our sample firms each year between 2001 and 
2011. In constructing the network, we allow information to flow bi-directionally between connected 
firms. We then use each of our networks to calculate annual centrality measures for each firm’s board 
of directors. Corporate governance data, including board characteristics and membership, are collected 
from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance 
Database.8  Accounting and stock market data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream (DS). 
Our sample comprises 1355 unique ASX listed firms with 11,447 unique directors and 10,599 firm year 
observations. We use the director board seats information from SIRCA to construct our network 
measures using the UCINET 6 package. 
Panel A of Table 1 displays boardroom network characteristics for each sample year. On average there 
are 960 firms and 4,741 directors per year. We observe directors hold on average 1.25 boards seats per 
year, although this is declined from 1.3 in 2003 to 1.19 in 2011. We observe the maximum board seats 
held by a director has halved, from 12 in 2001 to six in 2011. On average, about 70% of the companies 
in the sample were connected to the largest network, comparable with Larcker et al. (2013) who reports 
an annual average of 72% for US companies, although this percentage also declines over time. The 
number of firms in isolated networks doubles over the sample period while the number of isolated firms 
(unconnected to any companies) increases slightly. It is therefore apparent that firms are becoming 
notably less connected, particularly following the Global Financial Crisis.   
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the centrality measures.  Overall sample averages of 
Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector are 0.34%, 9.6%, 0.25% and 1.68% respectively. Of 
note, all bar Closeness are skewed, suggesting the means are driven by a few well connected firms. For 
Closeness we note that Australian firms are more closely connected than UK or US firms.  Larcker et 
al. (2013) reports an overall closeness measure of 4.5% for US firms, while Horton et al. (2012) finds 
8.7% for UK firms. For the same measure we find a mean of 17.4%. Annual sample statistics of the 
centrality measures are presented in Panel C.  We observe that both Degree and Closeness decline over 
the sample period, consistent with Omer et al. (2013) and Larker et al. (2013).  However, Betweenness 
and Eigenvector display no obvious trends. The variation in trends suggest that these measures are 
capturing different aspects of connectivity and that some aspects of connectivity are declining over 
time.  
                                                     
8 Preparation for constructing the networks first involved identifying the directorships held by each director on a firm’s board, 
in the same year, using director names. To ensure the accuracy of the entries, any ambiguous names between years and firms, 
were manually cross-checked using director information from annual reports, the Bloomberg Professional® Service people 
search and other websites providing director records. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 presents descriptive and sample statistics of the firm performance measures and the control 
variables we employ. Panel A of Table 2 describes the distributional characteristics of the firm 
performance and control measures at t=0.  The overall sample average of 2.015 for TQ is rather high, 
interpreted as market value of assets being about two times that of the cost to replace those assets.  Omer 
et al. (2013) by contrast reports an average of 1.82 for US listed firms. We observe a low average ROA 
of -5.9%, which is heavily skewed as shown by the median ROA being 4.3%. Shultz et al. (2013) also 
reports negative average ROA for Australian listed firms over a similar period. The average TSR is 
17.1% compared with a median of just 2.9%, indicating a strong positive skew. We also observe 
considerable variation in the TSR with a standard deviation of 75.8%.  MV is significantly skewed to 
the right, with an average of $828.4 million and median of $64.79 million and considerable variation, a 
standard deviation of 2939.9 and an interquartile range between $14.41 million and $294.26 million.  
On average, firms are about 11 years old, with a median AGE of about 9.5 years. On average firms 
score 4.15 on the CG Index with a median of 4 and over half of all firms falling between 3 and 5. On 
average, 17.8% of the firm assets are funded with interest bearing debt.  Directors hold their positions 
for about 5 to 6 years, and a very small number of firms have female directors (upper quartile range is 
0). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Panel B shows the annual averages and medians (in parenthesis) of Tobin’s Q.  We observe a steady 
run up in average TQ to its highest level in 2007, however, following the GFC we see a marked decline 
in TQ. Following standard practice, we use the natural log of MV in regressions. To smooth out the 
skewed distributions of AGE, LEV, and TEN, we take the log of the variables for the regressions.  Taking 
the logistic transformation of AGE is also consistent with previous studies (e.g. Larcker et al., 2013).  
Additionally, we take the log of (1+ FEM) (Wooldridge, 2009) to ensure observations with zero female 
board members are included in the analysis. We deal with the skewness in TQ and TSR by taking the 
the natural log of TQ, and (1+TSR).  
4. Results 
4.1 Preliminary analysis 
To investigate the relationship between connectivity and firm performance, we first estimate 
correlations between connectivity, current year firm performance and control variables.  The estimates 
are presented in Table 3. The correlations show that each dimension of connectedness is correlated but 
not extremely highly.  The strongest observations we observe are between Degree and the other three 
connectivity measures, ranging from 0.69 to 0.73. Correlations between Closeness, Betweenness and 
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Eigenvector are weaker, between 0.45 and 0.5.  Overall, we observe that Degree, which is almost 
identical to the interlocks measure used in early studies, is highly correlated with other dimensions of 
connectivity, but doesn’t fully explain the other dimensions. Consideration of the wider dimensions 
may therefore provide additional insights.   
In terms of firm performance, the correlations with the connectivity estimates are extremely weak with 
coefficients between 0.01 and 0.17 for the connectivity measures and ROA and TSR. Conversely, the 
relationship between TQ and connectivity is negative, although still between -0.08 and -0.03.  These 
relationships do not indicate a strong association between connectivity and firm performance.  We 
observe strong relationships between connectivity and firm size, with coefficients between 0.3 and 0.5.  
Additionally, we see a strong relationship between MV and ROA, a weaker positive relationship with 
CG Index, and a strong negative relationship with risk. These are not surprising findings as larger firms 
generally have the ability to attract better, more connected directors and also, larger boards will tend to 
have higher connectivity. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
To investigate whether a firms positioning in the boardroom network is important for firm performance, 
we initially regress Tobin’s Q against the five connectivity measures, using both current and one-year 
ahead firm performance measures.  We use two regression methods, pooled OLS with time and industry 
dummies and fixed effects regressions where we also include the lagged dependent variable. The second 
regression controls for two potential sources of endogeneity, specifically omitted variables and 
simultaneity and is in line with previous studies in the area (Horton et al. 2012; Adam and Ferreira, 
2009).  
Table 4, current year Tobin’s Q, presents the main results of the analysis.  Overall, the results suggest 
that board connectivity is negatively associated with TQ, consistent with the general findings of Omer 
et al. (2013) and the board interlocks literature (Non & Franses, 2007; Santos et al., 2009), and with the 
correlation coefficients shown in Table 3. Specifically, we observe strong negative coefficients for all 
five connectivity measures at the 1% level with the exception of the fixed effects regression of DEG 
and BTW, which are significant at the 5% level. The result is also consistent irrespective whether we 
consider a simple pooled OLS regression with year and industry dummies or a fixed effect regression 
model with a lagged dependent variable and year dummies. Of note, the coefficients reduce in size 
when we run the fixed effects models, generally to about 1/3rd the size of the pooled OLS, but the 
significance generally stays strong. We also find that our regressions explain at least 20% of the 
variation in Tobin’s Q.  
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[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
With regard to the control variables, we observe that larger firms are consistently strongly associated 
with higher Tobin’s Q as is risk, suggesting larger companies and riskier companies have higher Tobin’s 
Q. In contrast, younger firms typically have lower Tobin’s Q, and in the fixed effects model we find 
that more highly levered firms have higher Tobin’s Q, while firms with higher internal corporate 
governance have lower Tobin’s Q. We also find that the lag of Tobin’s Q is consistently positive and 
significant, denoting a highly persistent firm performance measure over time suggesting that historical 
factors, such as the board’s selection process, may influence current performance. 
Table 5 presents the regression results for Tobin’s Q in the following year (t+1) against the five 
connectivity measures. The results are broadly supportive of the findings in Table 4. We observe 
significantly negative coefficients for all the connectivity variables when we use pooled OLS. The 
coefficients drop markedly when we employ fixed effects and include the lag of the dependent variable, 
but remain statistically significant for all the measures with the exception of BTW, albeit at a lower 
significance level for DEG and EIG. The control variables are also broadly consistent with the results 
for the current year Tobin’s Q, with the exception of MV, which loses significance in the fixed effects 
regressions.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Overall, our main results suggest that higher levels of connectivity are detrimental to firm performance 
when measured using Tobin’s Q. The harmful impacts occur irrespective of the connectivity dimension 
that we consider, be it direct connections, network centrality, information flows and the ability to control 
the flow of information, or the quality of a company’s connections. The finding of the negative impact 
of direct connections (DEG) is consistent with the interlock literature which has found that more director 
connections harms firm performance. The literature that considers wider connectivity dimensions have 
found mixed results. Of the studies that consider either Tobin’s Q or the market to book ratio (a common 
proxy for Tobin’s Q), we support Andres et al. (2013), who study connectivity in Germany, and Omer 
et al. (2013) in the United States, who both find that on average firm performance is lower for firms 
with highly connected boards.  
 
4.3 Robustness Analysis 
To ensure the robustness of our main finding we test a number of additional specifications including 
using alternative measures of firm performance, testing for non-linearity in the relationship, focusing 
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on those firms associated with the main network, employing Fama-Macbeth regressions and controlling 
for reverse causality.  
4.3.1. Alternative Firm Performance Measures 
While Tobin’s Q is a popular measure of firm performance, other measures of firm performance have 
been employed in previous studies considering board connectivity. Two other measures which have 
been used in several prior studies are the return on assets (Horton et al. 2012; Omer et al. 2013; Larcker 
et al. 2013) and stock returns (Horton et al. 2012; Larcker et al. 2013). Given that both Horton et al. 
(2013) and Larcker et al. (2013) findings contrast with our own, considering alternative firm 
performance measures may help to shed light on whether the mixed results in prior literature is due to 
differences in the measure of firm performance.  
We re-run our regression specification where we include fixed effects and the lagged dependent 
variable, employing current year return on assets and total stock returns. We define ROA as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the average of book value 
total assets. Using the operating ROA reduces the impact of factors unrelated to performance such as 
accounting decisions regarding depreciation (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Omer et al., 
2013). We also test the current year total stock returns (TSR)  using  the adjusted closing price of the 
firm’s security at the end of December and incorporating gross dividends, which we assume were 
reinvested at the closing price on the firms ex-dividend date (Core et al., 1999). Correlation coefficients 
in Table 3 indicate that while there is a negative relationship between connectivity and Tobin’s Q, there 
are weak positive relationships with both ROA and TSR.  
The results in Table 6 show strong support for our earlier findings irrespective of the measure of firm 
performance. For both ROA and TSR we observe statistically significant negative relationships with all 
five connectivity measures, significant at the 1% level. If anything, the results of our alternative firm 
performance measures display stronger significance than for the TQ results. The results also suggest 
that differences in the measure of firm performance cannot explain the differences we observe with 
Larcker et al. (2013) and Horton et al. (2012).   
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.3.2 Non-linearity in the effect of board connectivity 
While the linear results suggest a negative relationship between connectivity and firm performance, it 
is likely that the relationship is more complicated than a simple linear relationship. While large levels 
of connectivity are likely to be harmful, it is possible that some connectivity may have more positive 
implications for firm performance as was observed in Santos et al. (2009). To test this proposition, we 
create two dummy variables for each of the connectivity variables, high and low. For each year we rank 
the firms based on their connectivity score for each dimension and assign a 1 to the high dummy if they 
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are in the highest 25%, and 1 to the low dummy if they are in the lowest 25%. We then regress the high 
and low dummies against Tobin’s Q in the current and next year (t+1).  
The results for the non-linearity testing are presented in Table 7, based on the fixed effects model with 
LDV. We find evidence that a little connectivity produces a positive impact, while large amounts result 
in a reduction in firm performance. Specifically, when we consider TQ in the current year we observe 
positive coefficients for the low connectivity group for four of the five groups, and only DEG has an 
insignificant coefficient. The high group in contrast has significantly negative coefficients for all 
connectivity measure except BTW. The results for t+1 are weaker, we find significant positive 
coefficients for CLO, EIG and CONN for the low connectivity groups and significantly negative 
coefficients for the same connectivity measures for the high group. This overall suggest that low levels 
of connectivity appear to be beneficial, possibly bringing in enough information and resources to 
augment the management team without overloading the board or unduly undermining board monitoring. 
However, high connectivity reduces firm performance.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
 
4.3.3 Main Component 
The full sample we employ contains a number of firms that are either completely isolated, with no 
directors who sit on the boards of other publicly listed companies, or small networks made up of a few 
companies who share directors in common, but who are not connected to the main network. We remove 
these extremes examples of low connectivity and re-run the main model with just the main network 
companies. The results, shown in Table 8, support the earlier findings. We find significant negative 
relationships between the connectivity measures and TQ in the current year for all except DEG. In t+1 
we again observe weaker significance, with just CLO and EIG significant, indicating that being more 
central and being connected to other highly connected firms is associated with reduced firm 
performance.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
4.3.4 Fama-MacBeth 
We employ a commonly used alternate estimation method to ensure the results are not driven by the 
choice of model, specifically the Fama-MacBeth (FMB) (1973) two stage method. In the first stage we 
estimate a cross-sectional regression of firm performance on each of the connectivity measures for each 
year in our sample between 2001 and 2011. After estimating these regressions, we average each of the 
cross-sectional coefficients over the number of years in the sample.   
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Table 9 reports the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions. The results are broadly supportive of the 
earlier main model findings. We observe that irrespective of the aspect of connectivity captured, more 
connected firms appear to perform worse, or at best, no better than less connected firms.  Specifically, 
we observe negative and significant coefficients for all connectivity measures for TQ in the current 
year, and for DEG, CLO and CONN in t+1. Additionally, the control variables remain consistent with 
the earlier pooled OLS estimates. Overall, the different estimation method does not appear to impact 
the results substantially. 
 [INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
4.3.5 Change Regressions 
In Section 4.2 we employed Equation (7) including fixed effects with the lag of the firm performance 
measure, to control for unobserved factors such as a firm’s board selection process and director 
preferences. These specifications have been used in other corporate governance (Adams and Ferreria, 
2009) and board connectivity studies (Horton et al., 2012) to control for potential sources of 
endogeneity. While endogeneity does not appear to be a concern, we undertake additional testing to 
control for potential reverse causality. Specifically, the network literature argues that if a company 
views connectivity as a beneficial governance mechanism, firms might increase connectivity by 
appointing more connected directors to a board to improve firm performance. An alternative 
interpretation might be that better performing firms are able to attract better quality, and therefore, more 
connected directors. To test for this, we look at changes in connectivity on changes in firm performance 
where we measure the difference in connectivity and firm performance measures between years t0 and 
t-1, and also t-1 - t-2 for firm performance (Andres, 2013; Yermack, 1996).9 Following prior research, we 
also include changes in the control variables (t0 - t-1) that we employed earlier. Year and industry 
dummies are included with standard errors clustered by firm. 
Table 10 provides the estimates of the change regressions. The results show no significant association 
between firm performance changes and the contemporaneous changes in connectivity.  There is weak 
evidence that changes in past performance increases the Eigenvector coefficient. This suggests that 
better past performance improves the boards connections to better connected boards, possibly through 
the firm’s board members being selected onto other boards or attracting better quality new directors.   
                                                     
9 Andres (2013) employs changes in board centrality measures on stock returns, and Yermack (1996) looks at changes in board 
size on stock returns.  We include the four firm performance measures used in this study for a more robust conclusion.  
Additional to the controls used in the previous studies, we control for board size and risk.  A change in board size is expected 
to have an effect on connectivity and a positive change in risk may prompt firms to increase connections in search for a stronger 
resource base. 
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[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
Overall the results strongly dismiss evidence that connected boards add value to firms. While the 
resource dependency theory argues that connected directors bring valuable resources to the firm that 
managers can exploit to improve firm performance, we find no evidence that this is the case. Rather, 
we find that either connected board members are undermining the monitoring role of directors, they are 
bringing in poor quality information or that they are bringing in too much information for the board to 
deal with. These results are robust to alternative estimation methods, and the inclusion of past firm 
performance or estimating the results using change variables, where the relationship becomes broadly 
insignificant.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Resource dependency theory asserts that the board provides managers with additional resources, such 
as connections, experience, inference and counsel, which can be used to drive firm performance 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). By extension, companies can obtain external 
resources through connections to other boards (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Therefore, well-connected 
directors have been argued as adding value by being more able beneficial in the resource dependency 
role.  Prior research has established that information flows between firms through multiple dimensions 
of board connectivity, however the findings to date do not provide conclusive evidence on the economic 
effect of being well connected. We contribute to this literature stream using four social network 
measures that capture different aspects of a board’s connectedness (Freeman, 1979; Opsahl et al., 2010), 
the quantity (Degree), quality and speed (Closeness) of information, the ability to control the network 
flow (Betweenness), and the power to access more information through connections with the best-
connected firms (Eigenvector), and a connectivity factor.  
The results show that board connectivity plays no role in increasing firm performance, and for the most 
part actually results in worse firm performance. Our findings are supportive of Omer et al. (2013) and 
Andres et al. (2013) who both find that even when considering a broader definition of connectivity than 
is employed in the interlock literature, connectivity is not a beneficial board characteristic. We perform 
a number of robustness tests including controlling for alternative measures of firm performance, 
alternative estimation methods and looking at the impact of changes in connectivity on changes in firm 
performance. Our results remain broadly supportive. Of note, we do find evidence that small amounts 
of connectivity are beneficial, with positive relationships between connectivity and firm performance 
for the least connected firms and negative relationships for the most connected firms. Further research 
is needed to determine the optimal amount of connectivity for firms. A notable implication of our 
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findings is the need for more suitable individuals to increase the pool of directors available such that 
the number of interlocks and therefore connectivity can be reduced.  
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Appendix I 
Principal Components Analysis 
The PCA results for eigenvalues show that the eigenvalue for the first component (2.76) is much larger than 
than the second component (0.56) and accounts for 69% of the total variance.  This indicates that the 
connectivity measures are unidimensional. 
PCA Output: 
Number of observations: 10559 
Number of Components with eigenvalue>1: 1 
Trace: 4 
Rho: 0.6912 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) 
Component Eigenvalue Difference   Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.76463 2.20041  0.6912 0.6912 
Comp2 0.564221 0.0432384  0.1411 0.8322 
Comp3 0.520983 0.370818  0.1302 0.9625 
Comp4 0.150164 .   0.0375 1 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1 Unexplained  
DEGREE 0.5696 0.1029 
CLOSE 0.4796 0.3641 
BETWEEN 0.4783 0.3674 
EIGEN 0.4655 0.4009 
 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha Validity Test 
To test the validity and reliability of the connectivity measures used to construct the measure Conn, we 
compute Cronbach’s Alpha using standardized variables (mean 0, standard deviation 1). 
Cronbach’s Alpha output: 
Test scale = mean (standardized items) 
      average  
    item-test item-rest inter-item  
Item Obs Sign correlation correlation correlation alpha 
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DEGREE 10559 + 0.9406 0.8831 0.4585 0.7175 
CLOSE 10559 + 0.7968 0.6337 0.6175 0.8288 
BETWEEN 10559 + 0.797 0.6341 0.6172 0.8287 
EIGEN 10559 + 0.7803 0.6077 0.6357 0.8396 
         
Test scale     0.5822 0.8479 
 
Inter-item correlations (obs=10559 in all pairs) 
  DEGREE CLOSE BETWEEN EIGEN 
DEGREE 1     
CLOSE 0.7334 1    
BETWEEN 0.7039 0.4698 1   
EIGEN 0.6805 0.4378 0.468 1 
 
The test score 0.8479 is greater than 0.80, therefore the variables used are considered to be statistically reliable. 
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 Figure 1: Graph Illustration of Connected Boards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 2001 Aggregate Boardroom Network of Australian Listed Firms 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 presents a visual representation of the network of Australian listed firms in 2001.  The figure 
demonstrates that Australia has a very significant main component, represented by the blue circles comprising 
73.1% of the sample firms. These firms are all interconnected, where the firms on the fringes are less connected 
than those in the centre.  The figure also contains a number of smaller networks, disconnected from the main 
component, represented by blue squares and ranging from two to eight firms.  In total, 9.5% of the sample 
firms in 2001 are in such disconnected networks. The remaining 17.4% of firms, not shown in the figure, are 
isolates; firms with no directors in common with any other publicly listed board
Borgatti, S.P. (2002). NetDraw: Graph Visualization Software. Harvard: Analytic Technologies 
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Table 1. 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics of Boardroom Network Characteristics and Connectivity measures 
Panel A: Boardroom network characteristics 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
N Firms 971 958 992 987 1,020 1,034 1,021 966 941 900 769 10,559 
N Directors 4,884 4,838 4,835 4,746 4,887 5,021 5,093 4,808 4,633 4,459 3,943 52,147 
N Directorates 6,199 6,179 6,283 6,062 6,219 6,361 6,346 5,917 5,654 5,392 4,673 65,285 
Avg Directorships 
held 
1.27 1.28 1.30 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.25 1.23 1.22 1.21 1.19 1.25 
Max Directorships 
held 
12 11 11 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 8.20 
Max board size 21 18 19 20 16 17 17 16 17 16 17 17.4 
Main  (Largest) 
Component % 
73.1 74.1 74.5 72.2 71.8 72.7 70.0 65.2 65.1 64.7 57.6 69.5 
Other components % 9.5 7.8 6.7 8.3 8.6 9.7 11.1 13.9 11.8 13.0 18.5 10.6 
Isolated firms % 17.4 18.1 18.9 19.5 19.6 17.6 18.9 20.9 23.1 22.3 23.9 19.9 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of connectivity 
 Mean SD P25 Median P75 Skew Obs 
DEG 0.0034 0.0035 0.0010 0.0022 0.0050 1.647 10559 
CLO 0.0957 0.0694 0.0013 0.1147 0.1495 -0.300 10599 
BTW 0.0025 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 3.9075 10599 
EIG 0.0168 0.0424 0.000 0.0005 0.0101 4.3226 10599 
Panel C: Sample averages (medians) of connectivity by year 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
DEG 0.0039 0.0040 0.0041 0.0037 0.0034 0.0033 0.0031 0.0030 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 0.0034 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0022) 
CLO 0.112 0.116 0.119 0.109 0.101 0.103 0.094 0.081 0.075 0.075 0.057 0.096 
 (0.136) (0.138) (0.143) (0.133) (0.125) (0.123) (0.114) (0.101) (0.095) (0.096) (0.073) (0.115) 
BTW 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 0.0024 0.0026 0.0026 0.0025 0.0023 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.00252 
  (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EIG 0.0068 0.0194 0.0203 0.0170 0.0154 0.0164 0.0180 0.0173 0.0185 0.0184 0.0177 0.01682 
  (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Presented here are various statistics for the sample of Australian listed firms from 2001 through 2011.  Panel A displays annual network 
characteristics of the aggregate boardroom network. Directors include all directors and alternative directors.  A directorship is defined 
here as a board position held by one director in the respective year. A component represents a subset of an entire network of a group 
of firms that are directly or indirectly connected.  The main component is the largest group of firms directly or indirectly connected 
through shared directors. Isolated firms are those with no connections in the network.  Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 
connectivity measures Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector (see Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively in Section 
3.1). DEG is defined as the number of first degree links from firm i to all other firms in the network; CLO denotes the sum of the 
inversed shortest distances between firm i and all other directly and indirectly connected firms; and BTW is the number of times a firm 
occurs on the shortest path linking two other firms. EIG denotes the connectivity a firms direct connections. All connectivity measures 
are normalised to represent the proportion of the maximum possible score of each measure.  Panel D displays annual sample statistics 
of averages (medians) of the four centrality measures.  All data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
(SIRCA) Corporate Governance Database. 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive and Sample Statistics of Firm Performance 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm performance 
 Mean SD Q25 Median Q75 Skew Obs 
TQ 2.015 1.550 1.007 1.402 2.389 1.737 10214 
ROA -0.059 0.409 -0.152 0.043 0.149 -2.179 10383 
TSR 0.171 0.758 -0.314 0.029 0.414 1.598 10201 
MV($M) 828.37 2939.9 14.41 64.79 294.26 6.05 10214 
AGE(years) 10.92 7.71 5.46 9.53 14.54 1.22 10324 
LEV 0.178 0.255 0.000 0.087 0.277 2.962 10468 
RISK 0.610 0.330 0.320 0.542 0.818 1.042 10185 
CG Index 4.154 1.502 3 4 5 -0.145 10559 
FEM 0.043 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.453 10555 
TEN(years) 6.033 3.745 3.289 5.149 7.788 1.371 10559 
Panel B: Sample averages (medians) of firm performance by year 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL 
TQ 1.708 1.800 1.801 2.021 2.090 2.267 2.660 2.063 1.846 1.920 1.896 2.015 
 (1.178) (1.259) (1.247) (1.480) (1.561) (1.746) (1.921) (1.394) (1.174) (1.275) (1.285) (1.402) 
Presented here are firm performance summary statistics of the sample of Australian listed firms from 2001 through 2011, Panel A 
provides descriptive statistics for each of the firm performance measures while Panel B displays the sample averages (medians) of firm 
performance measures for each year. ROA is measured as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled 
by the book value of average total assets; TQ is total liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / 
total assets; TSR represents the annual total stock return measured at calendar year-end including dividends. MV represents firm size, 
the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is 
firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters 
Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar 
year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM represents the 
ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all 
current directors on the board divided by board size; DUAL is duality, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is chairman 
of the board, and 0 otherwise. Accounting data are collected at fiscal year-end and measured in year t. All data are collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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Table 3. 
Pearson Pairwise Correlations 
 ROA TQ TSR DEG CLO BTW EIG MV LEV AGE RISK CG Index FEM TEN 
ROA 1              
TQ -0.264 1             
TSR 0.192 0.102 1            
DEG 0.138 -0.071 0.042 1           
CLO 0.161 -0.060 0.064 0.734 1          
BTW 0.084 -0.034 0.031 0.705 0.471 1         
EIG 0.122 -0.074 
 
0.013 0.682 0.440 0.472 1        
MV 0.400 0.118 0.134 0.474 0.418 0.350 0.423 1       
LEV -0.005 -0.060 -0.065 0.086 0.074 0.057 0.074 0.096 1      
AGE 0.025 -0.103 -0.003 0.127 0.012 0.116 0.137 0.131 0.048 1     
RISK -0.427 0.126 -0.045 -0.276 -0.301 -0.165 -
0.232 
-0.552 -0.073 -0.046 1    
CG Index 0.1035 -0.078 0.014 0.078 0.105 0.096 104 0.248 0.017 -0.028 -0.155 1   
FEM 0.096 -0.028 -0.000 0.151 0.134 0.110 0.181 0.200 0.039 0.018 -0.126 0.038 1  
TEN 0.236 -0.102 0.077 -0.007 -0.041 -0.018 0.072 0.167 0.052 0.359 -0.269 0.073 0.048 1 
Provided here are Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the dependant variables ROA, TQ, TSR and independent variables 
used in Equation (7).  The sample includes a total of 10599 firm-year observations of Australian listed firms over 2001 through 2011.  
Firms with missing observations are excluded from the tests. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG denote the connectivity measure Degree, 
Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1. ROA is measured as 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the book value of average total assets; TQ is total 
liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets; TSR represents the annual total stock return 
measured at calendar year-end including dividends. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end 
expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE 
is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock 
return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the 
Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM represents the ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the 
average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; 
DUAL is duality, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. Accounting and 
corporate governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) 
Corporate Governance Database. 
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Table 4. 
Regression Results for Current Year Tobin’s Q on Firm Connectivity Measures 
 TQ_OLS TQ_FE TQ_OLS TQ_FE TQ_OLS TQ_FE TQ_OLS TQ_FE TQ_OLS TQ_FE 
Constant -0.700*** -1.323*** -0.608*** -1.295*** -0.653*** -1.329*** -0.739*** -1.330*** -0.817*** -1.354*** 
 (0.0882) (0.108) (0.0871) (0.108) (0.0876) (0.109) (0.0896) (0.109) (0.0919) (0.109) 
DEG -22.25*** -6.893**         
 (3.386) (2.960)         
CLO   -1.013*** -0.486***       
   (0.164) (0.125)       
BTW     -9.862*** -2.944**     
     (1.805) (1.271)     
EIG       -1.598*** -0.574***   
       (0.216) (0.149)   
CONN         -0.0525*** -0.0222*** 
         (0.00697) (0.00570) 
MV 0.105*** 0.148*** 0.101*** 0.149*** 0.0955*** 0.147*** 0.100*** 0.147*** 0.107*** 0.149*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00880) (0.00636) (0.00879) (0.00616) (0.00875) (0.00629) (0.00871) (0.00661) (0.00883) 
LEV 0.00369 0.334*** -0.00376 0.331*** 0.000349 0.334*** -0.00447 0.334*** 0.00331 0.332*** 
 (0.0852) (0.0541) (0.0850) (0.0537) (0.0852) (0.0540) (0.0856) (0.0540) (0.0848) (0.0540) 
AGE -0.0834*** -0.0937** -0.0934*** -0.0980*** -0.0919*** -0.0999*** -0.0894*** -0.102*** -0.0832*** -0.0954*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0368) (0.0174) (0.0366) (0.0174) (0.0368) (0.0173) (0.0368) (0.0173) (0.0367) 
RISK 0.432*** 0.256*** 0.423*** 0.255*** 0.435*** 0.256*** 0.439*** 0.259*** 0.431*** 0.256*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0241) (0.0325) (0.0241) (0.0325) (0.0242) (0.0327) (0.0241) (0.0325) (0.0241) 
CG Index -0.00655 -0.0203*** -0.00494 -0.0200*** -0.00619 -0.0198*** -0.00656 -0.0197*** -0.00506 -0.0201*** 
 (0.00731) (0.00535) (0.00731) (0.00534) (0.00727) (0.00533) (0.00725) (0.00533) (0.00729) (0.00534) 
FEM -0.195 0.0469 -0.208 0.0613 -0.224 0.0488 -0.178 0.0628 -0.167 0.0637 
 (0.145) (0.117) (0.148) (0.117) (0.145) (0.118) (0.145) (0.117) (0.145) (0.117) 
TEN -0.0345* 0.00629 -0.0324 0.00327 -0.0290 0.00691 -0.0250 0.00767 -0.0361* 0.00373 
 (0.0208) (0.0192) (0.0207) (0.0191) (0.0207) (0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0192) 
TQ t-1  0.346***  0.344***  0.345***  0.346***  0.345*** 
  (0.0151)  (0.0151)  (0.0151)  (0.0151)  (0.0151) 
           
Observations 9,924 9,630 9,924 9,630 9,924 9,630 9,924 9,630 9,924 9,630 
R-squared 0.222 0.349 0.220 0.351 0.216 0.349 0.220 0.350 0.224 0.351 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
FIXED EFFECTS NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Presents regression results for pooled OLS (OLS) and firm fixed effect regressions (FE) for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG 
denote the connectivity measure Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1 while CONN is a PCA factor generated from the 
four connectivity measures, TQ is defined as total liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at 
fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears 
in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents 
the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM represents the ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years 
served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; TQ t-1 is a lagged dependent variable. YEAR and INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate 
governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance Database. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant 
at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. 
Regression Results for Next Year Tobin’s Q on Firm Connectivity Measures 
 TQ t+1_OLS TQ t+1_FE TQ t+1_OLS TQ t+1_FE TQ t+1_OLS TQ t+1_FE TQ t+1_OLS TQ t+1_FE TQ t+1_OLS TQ t+1_FE 
Constant -0.188** 0.331*** -0.135 0.357*** -0.155* 0.327*** -0.210** 0.326*** -0.253*** 0.309** 
 (0.0901) (0.125) (0.0883) (0.125) (0.0891) (0.125) (0.0915) (0.125) (0.0940) (0.126) 
DEG -12.92*** -5.919*         
 (3.423) (3.309)         
CLO   -0.629*** -0.435***       
   (0.171) (0.161)       
BTW     -4.848*** -1.086     
     (1.736) (1.350)     
EIG       -0.914*** -0.439**   
       (0.207) (0.183)   
CONN         -0.0300*** -0.0165*** 
         (0.00704) (0.00639) 
MV 0.0581*** 0.00811 0.0562*** 0.00917 0.0521*** 0.00730 0.0554*** 0.00738 0.0595*** 0.00868 
 (0.00676) (0.00929) (0.00653) (0.00939) (0.00628) (0.00924) (0.00641) (0.00923) (0.00676) (0.00931) 
LEV 0.00575 0.198*** 0.00227 0.196*** 0.00281 0.198*** 0.000182 0.198*** 0.00508 0.196*** 
 (0.0864) (0.0584) (0.0863) (0.0577) (0.0866) (0.0583) (0.0867) (0.0584) (0.0862) (0.0582) 
AGE -0.0753*** -0.113** -0.0810*** -0.116** -0.0811*** -0.119** -0.0791*** -0.120** -0.0754*** -0.115** 
 (0.0177) (0.0476) (0.0177) (0.0473) (0.0178) (0.0475) (0.0177) (0.0475) (0.0177) (0.0474) 
RISK 0.337*** 0.162*** 0.331*** 0.160*** 0.339*** 0.162*** 0.341*** 0.164*** 0.336*** 0.162*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0278) (0.0329) (0.0278) (0.0330) (0.0279) (0.0331) (0.0279) (0.0329) (0.0278) 
CG Index -0.00328 -0.0145** -0.00228 -0.0143** -0.00325 -0.0141** -0.00327 -0.0140** -0.00247 -0.0144** 
 (0.00776) (0.00674) (0.00775) (0.00674) (0.00774) (0.00672) (0.00773) (0.00672) (0.00775) (0.00673) 
FEM -0.0904 -0.0524 -0.0979 -0.0393 -0.111 -0.0537 -0.0818 -0.0405 -0.0758 -0.0404 
 (0.157) (0.136) (0.158) (0.136) (0.157) (0.137) (0.157) (0.136) (0.157) (0.136) 
TEN -0.0182 0.0529** -0.0176 0.0501** -0.0142 0.0544** -0.0125 0.0542** -0.0191 0.0512** 
 (0.0213) (0.0238) (0.0213) (0.0237) (0.0214) (0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0238) (0.0213) (0.0238) 
TQ t-1  0.115***  0.114***  0.115***  0.115***  0.114*** 
  (0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.0160) 
           
Observations 9,509 9,228 9,509 9,228 9,509 9,228 9,509 9,228 9,509 9,228 
R-squared 0.179 0.139 0.178 0.140 0.176 0.138 0.178 0.139 0.179 0.139 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
FIXED EFFECTS NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Presents regression results for pooled OLS (OLS) and firm fixed effect regressions (FE) for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG denote the connectivity 
measure Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1 while CONN is a PCA factor generated from the four connectivity measures, 
TQ_t+1 is defined as total liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets for the next year. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal 
year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in 
Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents 
the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM represents the ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years 
served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; TQ t-1 is a lagged dependent variable. YEAR and INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate 
governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance Database. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant 
at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. 
Regression Results for Current Year ROA and Total Stock Return on Firm Connectivity Measures 
 ROA_CY ROA_CY ROA_CY ROA_CY ROA_CY RET_CY RET_CY RET_CY RET_CY RET_CY 
Constant -0.739*** -0.722*** -0.744*** -0.745*** -0.762*** -0.639*** -0.591*** -0.650*** -0.654*** -0.699*** 
 (0.0769) (0.0770) (0.0768) (0.0769) (0.0775) (0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
DEG -5.841***     -13.17***     
 (2.044)     (3.011)     
CLO  -0.310***     -0.830***    
  (0.0905)     (0.153)    
BTW   -2.706***     -4.976***   
   (0.857)     (1.394)   
EIG    -0.380***     -1.462***  
    (0.145)     (0.170)  
CONN     -0.0166***     -0.0436*** 
     (0.00405)     (0.00575) 
MV 0.0688*** 0.0692*** 0.0685*** 0.0681*** 0.0694*** 0.0526*** 0.0541*** 0.0516*** 0.0516*** 0.0546*** 
 (0.00574) (0.00570) (0.00570) (0.00567) (0.00573) (0.00925) (0.00919) (0.00927) (0.00922) (0.00924) 
LEV -0.310*** -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.310*** -0.311*** -0.289*** -0.293*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.291*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0471) (0.0472) (0.0474) (0.0471) (0.0613) (0.0605) (0.0612) (0.0608) (0.0609) 
AGE -0.00843 -0.0130 -0.0136 -0.0156 -0.0105 0.0367 0.0277 0.0245 0.0201 0.0340 
 (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0447) (0.0440) (0.0444) (0.0440) (0.0441) 
RISK -0.0682*** -0.0691*** -0.0681*** -0.0663*** -0.0680*** 0.189*** 0.186*** 0.189*** 0.195*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0320) 
CG Index -0.00423 -0.00398 -0.00385 -0.00377 -0.00402 -0.0192*** -0.0188*** -0.0184*** -0.0181*** -0.0189*** 
 (0.00422) (0.00420) (0.00421) (0.00421) (0.00420) (0.00691) (0.00690) (0.00690) (0.00687) (0.00687) 
FEM 0.0870 0.0951 0.0891 0.0966 0.0991 -0.279* -0.255* -0.277* -0.237 -0.246* 
 (0.0859) (0.0853) (0.0855) (0.0854) (0.0855) (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) 
TEN 0.0600*** 0.0587*** 0.0604*** 0.0614*** 0.0584*** -0.0136 -0.0181 -0.0119 -0.0119 -0.0188 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0232) 
TQ t-1 -0.0460*** -0.0470*** -0.0468*** -0.0459*** -0.0467*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.216*** -0.214*** -0.216*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
           
Observations 9,579 9,579 9,579 9,579 9,579 9,632 9,632 9,632 9,632 9,632 
R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.359 0.361 0.359 0.361 0.361 
Number of firm 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Presents regression results for firm fixed effect regressions (FE) for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG denote the connectivity measure Degree, 
Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1 while CONN is a PCA factor generated from the four connectivity measures, ROA_CY is 
measured as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the book value of average total assets; RET_CY represents the annual total stock return measured at calendar 
year-end including dividends, both measured in the current year. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing 
stock price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s 
stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM 
represents the ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; TQ 
t-1 is a lagged dependent variable. YEAR and INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and 
stock market data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance 
Database. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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Table 7. 
Regression Results for Current Year Tobin’s Q on Firm Connectivity Measures considering potential non-linearity 
 TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 
Constant -1.338*** -1.351*** -1.350*** -1.349*** -1.350*** 0.310** 0.301** 0.308** 0.312** 0.299** 
 (-12.29) (-12.38) (-12.32) (-12.42) (-12.37) (2.480) (2.394) (2.469) (2.475) (2.377) 
DEG_lo 0.0181     0.0296     
 (1.138)     (1.494)     
DEG_hi -0.0312*     -0.0205     
 (-1.844)     (-1.028)     
CLO_lo  0.0467***     0.0541***    
  (2.888)     (2.664)    
CLO_hi  -0.0361**     -0.0374*    
  (-2.189)     (-1.944)    
BTW_lo   0.0296*     0.0265   
   (1.909)     (1.436)   
BTW_hi   -0.0116     0.00561   
   (-0.833)     (0.338)   
EIG_lo    0.0454***     0.0358*  
    (2.987)     (1.898)  
EIG_hi    -0.0357**     -0.0543***  
    (-2.117)     (-2.882)  
CONN_lo     0.0430***     0.0550*** 
     (2.648)     (2.692) 
CONN_hi     -0.0445***     -0.0361** 
     (-2.888)     (-2.471) 
MV 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.00806 0.00936 0.00763 0.00881 0.00912 
 (16.84) (16.86) (16.79) (16.87) (16.89) (0.870) (0.999) (0.824) (0.943) (0.977) 
LEV 0.334*** 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.330*** 0.332*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 (6.185) (6.173) (6.140) (6.136) (6.172) (3.387) (3.404) (3.371) (3.390) (3.393) 
AGE -0.0980*** -0.0985*** -0.0985*** -0.0985*** -0.0964*** -0.116** -0.116** -0.118** -0.116** -0.115** 
 (-2.670) (-2.686) (-2.686) (-2.686) (-2.635) (-2.441) (-2.452) (-2.489) (-2.440) (-2.431) 
RISK 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
 (10.64) (10.61) (10.62) (10.62) (10.65) (5.808) (5.793) (5.799) (5.789) (5.817) 
CG Index -0.0201*** -0.0199*** -0.0198*** -0.0198*** -0.0201*** -0.0143** -0.0142** -0.0141** -0.0143** -0.0143** 
 (-3.765) (-3.714) (-3.713) (-3.707) (-3.769) (-2.122) (-2.111) (-2.091) (-2.120) (-2.122) 
FEM 0.0457 0.0567 0.0466 0.0681 0.0560 -0.0531 -0.0419 -0.0527 -0.0242 -0.0468 
 (0.390) (0.487) (0.397) (0.584) (0.480) (-0.389) (-0.309) (-0.387) (-0.178) (-0.344) 
TEN 0.00622 0.00368 0.00545 0.00414 0.00337 0.0517** 0.0491** 0.0528** 0.0505** 0.0492** 
 (0.325) (0.193) (0.284) (0.217) (0.176) (2.174) (2.071) (2.217) (2.136) (2.072) 
TQ t-1 0.346*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (22.91) (22.80) (22.86) (22.83) (22.83) (7.179) (7.087) (7.161) (7.088) (7.105) 
           
Observations 9,630 9,630 9,630 9,630 9,630 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 
R-squared 0.349 0.350 0.349 0.350 0.350 0.139 0.140 0.138 0.140 0.140 
Number of firm 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Presents regression results for firm fixed effect regressions (FE) for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011. CY indicates DEG_hi, CLO_hi, BTW_hi and EIG_hi and CONN_hi 
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are the interaction between a dummy hi, defined as 1 if a firm-year connectivity score is in the top 25%, and the respective connectivity measure. DEG_lo, CLO_lo, BTW_lo and EIG_lo and CONN_lo 
are the interaction between a dummy lo, defined as 1 if a firm-year connectivity score is in the bottom 25%, and the respective connectivity measure. TQ is defined as total liabilities + preferred stock + 
market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock 
price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock 
return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM 
represents the ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; TQ 
t-1 is a lagged dependent variable. YEAR and INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and 
stock market data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance 
Database. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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Table 8. 
Regression Results for Current Year Tobin’s Q on Firm Connectivity Measures for the Main Component 
 TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 
Constant -1.396*** -1.302*** -1.400*** -1.400*** -1.409*** 0.202 0.306* 0.201 0.201 0.197 
 (0.127) (0.131) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.150) (0.156) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) 
DEG -2.757     -0.226     
 (3.255)     (3.466)     
CLO  -0.823**     -0.887**    
  (0.341)     (0.417)    
BTW   -2.282*     -0.348   
   (1.258)     (1.394)   
EIG    -0.446***     -0.358*  
    (0.148)     (0.189)  
CONN     -0.0147**     -0.00774 
     (0.00632)     (0.00684) 
MV 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.0242** 0.0266** 0.0243** 0.0245** 0.0250** 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
LEV 0.132* 0.136* 0.131* 0.132* 0.132* 0.0736 0.0770 0.0733 0.0730 0.0731 
 (0.0765) (0.0766) (0.0762) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0740) (0.0742) (0.0740) (0.0741) (0.0740) 
AGE -0.103** -0.102** -0.106** -0.108*** -0.103** -0.111** -0.106* -0.111** -0.112** -0.109** 
 (0.0418) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0540) (0.0542) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0539) 
RISK 0.227*** 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0382) 
CG Index -0.0152** -0.0151** -0.0150** -0.0149** -0.0152** -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0111 -0.0110 -0.0112 
 (0.00654) (0.00652) (0.00651) (0.00652) (0.00652) (0.00797) (0.00798) (0.00796) (0.00796) (0.00796) 
FEM -0.0676 -0.0528 -0.0620 -0.0465 -0.0550 -0.199 -0.181 -0.198 -0.182 -0.192 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) (0.152) (0.153) 
TEN 0.0210 0.0197 0.0195 0.0203 0.0189 0.0365 0.0344 0.0362 0.0355 0.0352 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.0295) (0.0296) 
TQ t-1 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.0648*** 0.0644*** 0.0647*** 0.0652*** 0.0647*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
           
Observations 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,412 6,412 6,412 6,412 6,412 
R-squared 0.338 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.124 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.124 
Number of firm 1,187 1,187 1,187 1,187 1,187 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Presents regression results for firm fixed effect regressions (FE) for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011 that are connected to the main network. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG 
denote the connectivity measure Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1 while CONN is a PCA factor generated from the 
four connectivity measures, TQ_CY is defined as total liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets in the current year, while TQ_t+1 represents the next year 
Tobin’s Q. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term 
debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock return volatility, measured as the standard 
deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM represents the ratio of female directors to board 
size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; TQ t-1 is a lagged dependent variable. YEAR and 
INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance Database. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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Table 9. 
Fama-MacBeth Regression Results for Current Year Tobin’s Q on Firm Connectivity Measures  
 TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_CY TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 TQ_t+1 
Constant -0.449*** -0.408*** -0.417*** -0.436*** -0.490*** -0.0266 -0.0184 -0.00859 -0.00643 -0.0385 
 (0.104) (0.0947) (0.0997) (0.109) (0.114) (0.0659) (0.0641) (0.0670) (0.0677) (0.0734) 
DEG -9.944***     -3.375*     
 (2.215)     (1.675)     
CLO  -0.451***     -0.236***    
  (0.106)     (0.0708)    
BTW   -3.801***     -0.664   
   (1.192)     (1.451)   
EIG    -0.614**     -0.144  
    (0.230)     (0.237)  
CONN     -0.0219***     -0.00735** 
     (0.00567)     (0.00374) 
MV 0.0514*** 0.0494*** 0.0469*** 0.0477*** 0.0519*** 0.0199*** 0.0202*** 0.0176*** 0.0170** 0.0198** 
 (0.00919) (0.00855) (0.00839) (0.00928) (0.00959) (0.00586) (0.00522) (0.00544) (0.00660) (0.00633) 
LEV 0.0549 0.0506 0.0546 0.0527 0.0542 0.0501 0.0492 0.0497 0.0480 0.0495 
 (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0581) (0.0597) (0.0589) (0.0577) (0.0581) (0.0580) (0.0582) (0.0578) 
AGE -0.0352*** -0.0389*** -0.0384*** -0.0380*** -0.0352*** -0.0331*** -0.0341*** -0.0348*** -0.0354*** -0.0332*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.00979) (0.0102) (0.00915) (0.00917) (0.00948) (0.00852) (0.00915) 
RISK 0.275*** 0.269*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.274*** 0.216*** 0.213*** 0.215*** 0.217*** 0.215*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0455) (0.0467) (0.0466) (0.0459) (0.0456) (0.0449) (0.0460) (0.0454) (0.0454) 
CG Index -0.00575 -0.00531 -0.00612* -0.00646* -0.00553 -0.00339 -0.00294 -0.00348 -0.00346 -0.00330 
 (0.00326) (0.00323) (0.00337) (0.00331) (0.00329) (0.00418) (0.00416) (0.00428) (0.00414) (0.00424) 
FEM -0.0975 -0.104 -0.110 -0.109* -0.0902 -0.0427 -0.0418 -0.0479 -0.0625 -0.0430 
 (0.0615) (0.0612) (0.0616) (0.0578) (0.0609) (0.0893) (0.0902) (0.0905) (0.0838) (0.0873) 
TEN 0.00304 0.00398 0.00556 0.00804 0.00291 0.00197 0.00140 0.00336 0.00492 0.00229 
 (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0117) 
TQ t-1 0.685*** 0.686*** 0.687*** 0.687*** 0.684*** 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.530*** 0.532*** 0.529*** 
 (0.00747) (0.00708) (0.00668) (0.00695) (0.00752) (0.00918) (0.00889) (0.00899) (0.00897) (0.00926) 
           
Observations 9,630 9,630 9,630 9,630 9,630 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 
R-squared 0.605 0.604 0.603 0.605 0.605 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.403 0.402 
Number of groups 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
YEAR NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIXED EFFECTS NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Presents regression results for Fama-MacBeth regressions for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011 that are connected to the main network. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG denote the 
connectivity measure Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1 while CONN is a PCA factor generated from the four 
connectivity measures, TQ_CY is defined as total liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets in the current year, while TQ_t+1 represents the next year 
Tobin’s Q. MV represents firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is firm leverage, long + short term 
debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents firm risk, the firm’s stock return volatility, measured as the standard 
deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM represents the ratio of female directors to board 
size; TEN is the average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all current directors on the board divided by board size; TQ t-1 is a lagged dependent variable. YEAR and 
INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance Database. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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Table 10. 
Regression Results for Change in Current Year Tobin’s Q on Change in Firm Connectivity Measures  
 DEG CLO BTW EIG CONN 
Constant 0.381*** 0.00798*** 0.000545*** 0.0213*** 0.381*** 
 (0.0443) (0.00208) (0.000188) (0.00206) (0.0443) 
TQ_CY -0.0259 -0.00218 -7.08e-05 0.000151 -0.0259 
 (0.0273) (0.00147) (0.000124) (0.000630) (0.0273) 
TQ t-1 0.00677 -0.000449 -9.60e-05 0.00161** 0.00677 
 (0.0246) (0.00130) (0.000116) (0.000769) (0.0246) 
MV 0.0373** 0.00243*** 8.41e-05 0.000166 0.0373** 
 (0.0159) (0.000937) (6.79e-05) (0.000334) (0.0159) 
LEV -0.000561 0.000340 -2.97e-05 0.000165 -0.000561 
 (0.00659) (0.000366) (3.31e-05) (0.000204) (0.00659) 
AGE 0.269*** 0.00676 0.000860** -0.00116 0.269*** 
 (0.0950) (0.00501) (0.000365) (0.00271) (0.0950) 
RISK 0.0632* 0.00234 -1.63e-05 0.00442*** 0.0632* 
 (0.0376) (0.00211) (0.000170) (0.000988) (0.0376) 
CG Index -0.0159 -0.000557 -5.88e-05 7.90e-05 -0.0159 
 (0.0103) (0.000526) (4.73e-05) (0.000244) (0.0103) 
FEM 0.214 0.0104 -0.000299 0.00751 0.214 
 (0.303) (0.0162) (0.00114) (0.00832) (0.303) 
TEN -0.329*** -0.0122*** -0.00101*** -0.00547*** -0.329*** 
 (0.0599) (0.00272) (0.000238) (0.00152) (0.0599) 
      
Observations 8,256 8,256 8,256 8,256 8,256 
R-squared 0.023 0.026 0.007 0.040 0.023 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
Presents regression results for regressions for a sample of Australian listed securities between 2001 and 2011 that are connected to the main network. DEG, CLO, BTW and EIG denote the change in the 
connectivity measure Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector defined at Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) respectively, in Section 3.1 and CONN is a PCA factor generated from the four connectivity 
measures, TQ_CY is defined as the change total liabilities + preferred stock + market capitalisation (fye) + minority interests / total assets in the current year, while TQ t-1 represents the change in the 
previous year’s Tobin’s Q. MV represents change in firm size, the market capitalisation measured at fiscal year-end expressed in millions (common shares outstanding*closing stock price); LEV is change 
in firm leverage, long + short term debt/total assets; AGE is firm age, the number of prior years the firm appears in Thompson Reuters Datastream; RISK represents change in firm risk, the firm’s stock 
return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the previous calendar year's monthly stock return; CG Index represents the Harris (2008) corporate governance index score for the firm; FEM 
represents the change in ratio of female directors to board size; TEN is the change in average tenure of the board, measured by the total number of years served by all current directors on the board divided 
by board size. YEAR and INDUSTRY are year and industry dummies respectively. Accounting and corporate governance data are collected at fiscal year-end in year t. Accounting and stock market data 
are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Corporate governance data are collected from Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) Corporate Governance Database. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and presented in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
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